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I. Introduction 
In the last five decades, the Supreme Court has consistently 
expanded the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.1 
Not only must states provide counsel to poor criminal defendants 
in serious cases,2 but states also must provide counsel to any 
defendant facing potential jail time,3 to minors in delinquency 
proceedings,4 and to defendants who appeal their state court 
convictions on direct appeal.5 Moreover, and perhaps most 
significant, the Court has held that state-funded lawyers must be 
effective in all of these contexts and during the plea-negotiation 
process.6 In recent years, the Court has added new dimensions to 
this latter requirement.7 For example, in death penalty cases, 
lawyers must meet a heightened standard of practice,8 and at 
                                                                                                     
 1. See cases cited infra notes 2–6 (explaining some of the developments 
and expansions that have been made to the right to counsel in the past fifty 
years). 
 2. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (finding a 
“fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal 
prosecution” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment). 
 3. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that absent 
a knowing waiver, an individual cannot be imprisoned unless he or she has been 
represented by counsel at trial). 
 4. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967) (finding that when a minor is 
facing delinquency charges, “the child and his parents must be notified of the 
child’s right to be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable 
to afford counsel, that counsel will be appointed to represent the child”). 
 5. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356–57 (1963) (finding that an 
indigent individual has the right to counsel on the first level of appeal). 
 6. See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (“This Court now 
holds that, as a general rule, defense counsel has the duty to communicate 
formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that 
may be favorable to the accused.”); Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1384 (2012) 
(“Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a right that extends to 
the plea-bargaining process.”); Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 669 
(1984) (“The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is the right to the effective 
assistance of counsel . . . .”); United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 656 (1984) 
(“The right to the effective assistance of counsel is thus the right of the accused 
to require the prosecution’s case to survive the crucible of meaningful 
adversarial testing.”). 
 7. See cases cited infra notes 8–9 (discussing the extension of the right to 
effective counsel to additional stages of representation). 
 8. See, e.g., Porter v. McCollum, 558 U.S. 30, 130 S. Ct. 447, 453 (2009) 
(applying Wiggins and finding counsel ineffective); Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 
 
GETTING REAL ABOUT GIDEON 1311 
least in some instances, lawyers for the poor must understand the 
collateral consequences that flow from a criminal conviction and 
advise clients accordingly.9 While the Court has continued to 
expand the contours of the right to counsel since its landmark 
decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,10 even the most basic 
understanding of the right to counsel has never been fully 
implemented on the ground. From the start, states have failed to 
fund the indigent defense function adequately, and as the volume 
of criminal cases has grown over the years, too few lawyers have 
faced ever-increasing workloads.11 The result has been what 
many have called “assembly-line justice”—in other words, 
egregious and persistent violations of the right to counsel.12 These 
violations have not gone unnoticed by academics and defenders. 
In the last fifty years, there have been significant efforts to 
document the indigent defense crisis and to correct it.13 Yet—
despite countless reports and articles detailing the crisis, state 
and federal court litigation, and attempts at legislative reform—
                                                                                                     
510, 521 (2003) (relying upon established ABA guidelines for performance of 
counsel in death penalty cases and finding counsel ineffective). 
 9. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1483 (2010) (finding counsel’s 
assistance ineffective because counsel failed to notify the client that his guilty 
plea made him subject to deportation). 
 10. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (finding a 
“fundamental right of the accused to the aid of counsel in a criminal 
prosecution” guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment). 
 11. See infra Part II. 
 12. See, e.g., NAACP LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, INC., ASSEMBLY LINE 
JUSTICE: MISSISSIPPI’S INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS 6–7 (2003) (providing an 
overview of the state’s broken indigent defense system). 
 13. See generally, e.g., ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASS’N CRIM. 
DEF. LAW., MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S 
BROKEN MISDEMEANOR COURTS (2009), http://www.nacdl.org/public.nsf/defense 
updates/misdemeanor/$FILE/Report.pdf (explaining the growing lack of 
adequate counsel for misdemeanor crimes); NAT’L RIGHT TO COUNSEL COMM., THE 
CONSTITUTION PROJECT, JUSTICE DENIED 49–99 (2009), http:/www. 
constitutionproject.org/pdf/139.pdf [hereinafter JUSTICE DENIED] (highlighting 
the areas of indigent counsel requiring reform); STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID 
& INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR ASS’N, GIDEON’S BROKEN PROMISE: AMERICA’S 
CONTINUING QUEST FOR EQUAL JUSTICE 7–21 (2004), http://www.american bar. 
org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants/ls_sclaid_def
_bp_right_to_counsel_in_criminal_proceedings.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter 
BROKEN PROMISE] (documenting some of the current problems in indigent 
defense and suggesting some improvements that can be made). 
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the right to counsel remains illusory for most poor criminal 
defendants. 
As we mark the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon, in this Article 
I argue that we can and should be more realistic in our efforts to 
enforce the right to counsel. Assuming, as many now do, that five 
decades of resource-starved indigent defense will likely continue 
in the future, where are our efforts most effectively deployed in 
the years to come? I address that question in three parts. Part II 
briefly acknowledges the entrenched crisis in indigent defense 
that is as old as the Gideon decision itself. Part III examines the 
most salient reform efforts of the last fifty years, highlighting 
those that have made a lasting impact on the provision of 
indigent defense services. Part IV suggests that some efforts of 
the last five decades need to be de-emphasized to make room for 
efforts that are achievable and imperative in the near term. In 
particular, I suggest that defenders need to seize upon this 
political and economic climate and pursue diversion and 
decriminalization; that systemic litigation should be rare and 
only a measure of last resort; and that the defense community 
needs to explore the role that nonlawyers can play in protecting 
the rights of criminal defendants.  
II. Fifty Years of “Crisis” 
Scholars and practitioners have documented extensively the 
ongoing crisis in indigent defense services over the last five 
decades.14 As I have discussed in prior works, there are as many 
factors contributing to the indigent defense crisis as there are 
symptoms of it.15 At bottom, though, defenders nationwide suffer 
                                                                                                     
 14. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Mary Sue Backus & 
Paul Marcus, The Right to Counsel in Criminal Cases, A National Crisis, 57 
HASTINGS L.J. 1031, 1034 (2006) (“[M]ore than half the lawyers entered pleas for 
their clients without spending any significant time on the cases, without 
interviewing witnesses or filing motions. Sometimes they barely spoke with 
their clients.”); Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An 
Argument from Institutional Design, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 802–07 (2004) 
(examining the role that inadequate funding plays in defective counsel). 
 15. See Cara H. Drinan, The National Right to Counsel Act: A 
Congressional Solution to the Nation’s Indigent Defense Crisis, 47 HARV. J. 
LEGIS. 487, 491–94 (2010) (analyzing some of the reasons that the indigent 
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from a lack of resources.16 Without adequate financial support, 
public defenders cannot hire adequate staff, they cannot train or 
retain lawyers, and they cannot sufficiently represent their clients.17 
Even at the time of the Gideon decision, there was great concern over 
how taxpayers could afford a widely applicable right to counsel.18 
That concern was legitimate, even if it did not undermine the 
constitutional argument in Gideon, and it has only proven more 
accurate over time.19 In 1986, Professor Stephen Gillers wrote a piece 
for the New York Times in which he discussed how little money states 
were allocating to indigent defense and the tragic consequences for 
poor defendants.20 Referring to the language of the Gideon Court’s 
decision, Gillers wrote: “Lofty ideas. They aren’t working.”21  
Fast forward several decades, and Professor Gillers’s words 
still resonate. The American Bar Association (ABA) released a 
report on the state of indigent defense services nationwide in 
2004 and aptly entitled the report “Gideon’s Broken Promise.”22 
One of the report’s key findings was that: “Forty years after 
Gideon v. Wainwright, indigent defense in the United States 
remains in a state of crisis, resulting in a system that lacks 
fundamental fairness and places poor persons at constant risk of 
                                                                                                     
defense crisis has continued); Cara H. Drinan, The Third Generation of Indigent 
Defense Litigation, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 427, 429–30 (2009) 
[hereinafter Drinan, Third Generation] (“There are other salient attributes to 
the indigent defense crisis . . . , but chronic underfunding is the common 
thread.”). 
 16. See Drinan, Third Generation, supra note 15, at 430 (“Inadequate 
funding is the root cause of the indigent defense crisis.”). 
 17. See id. (providing some of the necessary elements to maintain “an 
effective, efficient, high-quality, and ethical public defense system”). 
 18. See William Pincus, Programs to Supplement Law Offices for the Poor, 
41 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 887, 897 (1965) (“Is the American public ready to pay the 
price in tax dollars for more legal services and greater justice? There will be a 
struggle of major proportions.”). 
 19. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 13, at 49–99 (examining the continued 
lack of resources and staffing problems that indigent counsel faces). 
 20. Stephen Gillers, Poor Man, Poor Lawyer, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1986, at 
A31.  
 21. Id.  
 22. See BROKEN PROMISE, supra note 13, at v, 38 (assessing the progress 
America’s justice system has made towards meeting the goals of indigent 
defense representation). 
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wrongful conviction.”23 In 2009, The Constitution Project 
released a report on indigent defense services nationwide, finding 
that public defense remains underfunded and defense counsel are 
consistently overworked.24  
Recent national headlines demonstrate the breadth and 
scope of the indigent defense crisis. For example, in Utah, one of 
only two states that do not provide funding for public defender 
services, the county-based system is failing its clients in every 
way possible.25 Public defense contracts are awarded to the lowest 
bidders, and some contracts result in defense counsel earning less 
than $400 per felony case.26 The prosecutor in one county not only 
plays a role in selecting defense counsel, but also controls the 
budget of the county’s indigent defense system.27 In 
Pennsylvania, the American Civil Liberties Union filed suit 
challenging systemic deficiencies in representation more than 
fifteen years ago.28 Despite some initial improvements as a result 
of that suit,29 in 2011 the Joint State Government Commission 
reported that the system is still failing poor criminal 
defendants.30 The Tennessee Supreme Court recently proposed a 
                                                                                                     
 23. Id. at 38. 
 24. See JUSTICE DENIED, supra note 13, at 49–99 (examining the burdens 
placed on indigent defense counsel including insufficient funding and the heavy 
workload). 
 25. See generally AM. CIVIL LIB. UNION, FAILING GIDEON: UTAH’S FLAWED 
COUNTY-BY-COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER SYSTEM 7–11 (2011), http://www. 
acluutah.org/Failing_Gideon.pdf (finding that the county funding system used in 
Utah does not meet the standards of Gideon). 
 26. Id. at 7. 
 27. See Patsy Stoddard, Commission Makes Decision For Public Defenders, 
EMERY CNTY. PROGRESS (Nov. 15, 2011), http://www.ecprogress.com/ 
index.php?tier=1&article_id=11730 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (detailing the 
county attorney’s request for law firms to lower their bids to meet the county’s 
budget) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 28. See Vidhya K. Reddy, Indigent Defense Reform: The Role of Systemic 
Litigation in Operationalizing the Gideon Right to Counsel 24–30 (Wash. Univ. 
Sch. of Law, Working Paper No. 1279185, 2007), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=1279185 (describing a 1996 lawsuit in Allegheny County). 
 29. See id. at 28–29 (describing the court’s decision to extend the 
jurisdiction of the cases that required additional time to provide the defendant 
with counsel). 
 30. See JOINT STATE GOV’T COMM’N, A CONSTITUTIONAL DEFAULT: SERVICES 
TO INDIGENT CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN PENNSYLVANIA 2 (2011), 
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rule change that would allow for flat-fee defender contracts—a 
model widely recognized as creating a conflict-of-interest and 
unacceptable for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.31 Recent 
Department of Justice data confirms that this is an ongoing, 
national crisis: “[Seventy-nine percent] of reporting state public 
defender systems . . . exceeded nationally-recognized workload 
standards.”32  
In short, half a century has passed since the Gideon decision, 
and the right to counsel at the state level has yet to be realized. 
III. What We Should Celebrate and Sustain 
Despite my contention that Gideon’s mandate has never been 
fully implemented, the picture is not entirely gloomy. Academics, 
practitioners, and advocates of poor criminal defendants have 
worked tirelessly over the last five decades to enforce the right to 
counsel, and their efforts have not been in vain—even if much 
remains to be done, and even if a new approach to reform is 
warranted today. In this Part of the Article, I identify three 
achievements within the defense community during the last fifty 
years that are particularly worthy of celebration: (1) the 
development of professional standards and the dissemination of 
these standards through training and litigation;33 (2) the 
                                                                                                     
http://www.nlada.net/sites/default/files/pa_indigentdefensetaskforce_report_120
62011.pdf (“The lack of state financial support and oversight has led to a service 
deficiency syndrome . . . .”). 
 31. See David Carroll, Gideon Alert: Tennessee Supreme Court Proposes 
Rule Change Allowing Flat-Fee Contracting, JSERI (Aug. 23, 2011, 4:11 PM), 
http://www.nlada.net/jseri/blog/gideon-alert-tennessee-supreme-court-proposes-
rule-change-allowing-flat-fee-contracting (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“The 
Tennessee Supreme Court proposed a new rule change that attempts to find an 
easy answer to controlling indigent defense costs by allowing flat-fee contracting 
for right to counsel services, but the Court has neglected to provide institutional 
safeguards that would protect the adequacy of representation.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 32. David Carroll, Gideon Alert: DOJ Data Confirms Existence of Right to 
Counsel Workload Crisis In The United States, JSERI (Sep. 17, 2010, 10:56 AM), 
http://www.nlada.net/jseri/blog/gideon-alert-doj-data-confirms-existence-right-
counsel-workload-crisis-united-states (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 33. See discussion infra Part III.A (looking specifically at the American Bar 
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development of the collateral consequences doctrine and the 
constitutionalization of its significance to effective 
representation;34 and (3) the burgeoning trend toward data-
driven analysis and advocacy within the public defense 
community.35  
A. The Development of Professional Standards 
First, the defense community has made a lasting 
contribution to the representation of criminal defendants through 
the development of professional standards. In particular, the 
ABA is currently working on the third version of its Criminal 
Justice Standards (Standards).36 When the Standards were first 
released in 1968, Chief Justice Warren described them as “the 
single most comprehensive and probably the most monumental 
undertaking in the field of criminal justice ever attempted by the 
American legal profession in our national history.”37 Not only do 
the Standards define the contours of the prosecution and defense 
function, but they also provide particular guidance on issues such 
as capital litigation, mental health, and post-conviction 
remedies.38 More recently, the ABA’s Ten Principles of a Public 
Defense Delivery System39 (Ten Principles) and Eight Guidelines 
                                                                                                     
Association’s Criminal Justice Standards as a model of professional standards). 
 34. See discussion infra Part III.B (examining the impact of Padilla v. 
Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)). 
 35. See discussion infra Part III.C (emphasizing the progress made in 
compiling empirical assessments of public defenders’ work). 
 36. About Criminal Justice Standards, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/ 
groups/criminal_justice/policy/standards.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 37. Id. 
 38. See id. (providing the individual standards that are covered by the 
Criminal Justice Standards). 
 39. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY SYSTEM 1–3 (2002), 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent
_defendants/ls_sclaid_def_tenprinciplesbooklet.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter 
TEN PRINCIPLES] (“The Principles constitute the fundamental criteria necessary 
to design a system that provides effective, efficient, high quality, ethical, 
conflict-free legal representation for criminal defendants who are unable to 
afford an attorney.”).  
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of Public Defense Related to Excessive Workloads40 (Eight 
Guidelines) have made an equally significant contribution to the 
field. With these standards, the ABA has taken an official 
position, one respected by courts and legislatures, on what 
constitutes the necessary elements of constitutional 
representation.41  
In addition to the research and drafting of these standards—
a significant achievement in its own right—the ABA’s 
development of professional standards has had several critical 
downstream benefits. With established and recognized standards, 
individual defenders and public defender offices have been able to 
challenge inadequacies by reference to these standards.42 For 
example, the Ten Principles make clear what elements are 
threshold requirements for an effective public defense system, 
and when systems fail to comply with the Ten Principles, parties 
have relied upon them in lawsuits seeking systemic reform.43 
Similarly, the Eight Guidelines articulate a clear roadmap for 
defenders who are managing excessive workloads; the Guidelines 
address each step, from advising one’s supervisor to seeking 
redress in court if necessary.44 Recently, the Eight Guidelines 
were crucial to the Missouri Public Defender Office’s successful 
                                                                                                     
 40. See STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID & INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, AM. BAR 
ASS’N, EIGHT GUIDELINES OF PUBLIC DEFENSE 2–15 (2009), http://www. 
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/legal_aid_indigent_defendants
/ls_sclaid_def_eight_guidelines_of_public_defense.authcheckdam.pdf 
[hereinafter EIGHT GUIDELINES] (“These Guidelines are intended for the use of 
public defense programs and for lawyers who provide the representation, when 
they are confronted with too many persons to represent and are thus prevented 
from discharging their responsibilities under professional conduct rules.”).  
 41. See supra notes 39–40 (referencing practice guidelines created to assist 
public defenders in providing effective representation for their clients). 
 42. See, e.g., Amended Class Action Complaint at 68, Hurrell-Harring v. 
State, 866 N.Y.S.2d 92 (N.Y, Sup. Ct. 2008) (No. 8866–07), http:// 
www.nyclu.org/files/Amended%20Class%20Action%20Complaint.pdf (using the 
Ten Principles of the Public Defense Delivery System as a standard that New 
York’s indigent defense system has not met). 
 43. See id. (“New York’s indigent defense system does not even conform to 
the American Bar Association’s Ten Principles of Public Defense Delivery 
System.”). 
 44. See EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 40, at 1 (providing a “detailed action 
plan . . . to which those providing public defense should adhere as they seek to 
comply with their professional responsibilities”).  
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challenge of excessive workloads before its state supreme court.45 
Thus, well-developed professional standards have provided 
leverage to defenders challenging unconstitutional features of a 
defense function, as well as entire defense systems.  
Moreover, the establishment and recognition of these 
professional standards has led to a body of case law that defines 
the contours of effective representation. In Strickland v. 
Washington,46 the Supreme Court established the two-pronged 
test for whether defense counsel’s performance was effective, and 
its opinion relied upon the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 
regarding the defense function as a proxy for “prevailing norms of 
practice.”47 While scholars have uniformly and roundly criticized 
the toothless nature of the Strickland test for effective 
representation,48 it is nonetheless the test upon which defendants 
must rely, and sometimes defendants do prevail in making 
ineffective assistance claims.49 The fact that the Court has 
continued to invoke the ABA’s professional standards in its 
Strickland case law is a testament to the import of the standards. 
Formal training of public defenders has also flowed naturally 
from the establishment of professional standards. The Public 
Defender Service (PDS) in the District of Columbia has long been 
recognized as a model for the provision of defense services, and it 
offers training each summer for practitioners outside of PDS.50 
                                                                                                     
 45. See State ex rel. Mo. Public Defender Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 
592, 608 (Mo. 2012) (“No exception exists to the ethics rules for lawyers who 
represent indigent persons . . . . [T]here is an ‘implicit premise that 
governments . . . never intended that the lawyers who furnish the 
representation would be asked to do so if it meant violating their ethical duties 
pursuant to professional conduct rules.’” (citing EIGHT GUIDELINES)). 
 46. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 47. Id. at 668. 
 48. See generally Robert R. Rigg, The T-Rex Without Teeth: Evolving 
Strickland v. Washington and the Test for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 35 
PEPP. L. REV. 77, 86–100 (2007) (describing criticism of the doctrine but 
expressing reasons for optimism in recent applications). 
 49. See id. at 88–90 (illustrating a case in which an ineffective assistance 
claim prevailed under the Strickland standard). 
 50. See Criminal Defender Training Program, PUB. DEFENDER SERV., 
http://www.pdsdc.org/LegalCommunity/TrainingSummerSeries.aspx (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2013) (providing a general description of training offered) (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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More recently, the Southern Public Defender Training Center 
(SPDTC) was established to address the particularly acute 
indigent defense crisis in the southeastern region of the country.51 
Public defenders apply to be members of a class that trains with 
the nonprofit organization over the course of three years.52 
Training efforts like these rely upon well-recognized professional 
standards of practice for defenders.53 Thus, the defense 
community should celebrate the development and dissemination 
of clear professional standards, for these standards have had and 
will continue to have a lasting impact on the quality of defense 
representation. 
B. The Development of the Collateral Consequences Doctrine 
Second, practitioners and academics have changed the 
discourse of criminal defense entirely by explaining and 
constitutionalizing the significance of collateral consequences. 
Long before the Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky,54 
members of the defense community understood that effective 
representation entailed an obligation to consider all consequences 
of a conviction—not just those deemed criminal in nature.55 And 
                                                                                                     
 51. See generally Why We Are Needed, S. PUB. DEFENDER TRAINING CTR., 
http://thespdtc.org/about/why-we-are-needed/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) 
(“SPDTC was formed to inspire, mobilize and train legal professionals to provide 
the highest quality defense representation to people unable to afford an 
attorney.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 52. See Core Training 101, THE S. PUB. DEFENDER TRAINING CTR., 
http://thespdtc.org/training/core-training-101/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“Over a 
three year timespan, participants learn from some of the best current and 
former public defenders in the country while engaging in interactive 
workshops.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 53. See generally PUB. DEFENDER SERV., CRIMINAL DEFENDER TRAINING 
PROGRAM (2012), http://www.pdsdc.org/resources/summerseries/2012Registra 
tionMaterials.pdf (providing an idea of some of the content covered by the 
summer training for practitioners). 
 54. See Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010) (holding that 
counsel must inform their client of the risk of deportation to meet the 
requirements of the Sixth Amendment). 
 55. See Josh Bowers, Fundamental Fairness and the Path from Santobello 
to Padilla: A Response to Professor Bibas, 2 CAL. L. REV. CIRCUIT 52, 53 (2011) 
(“No doubt, [the Padilla decision] came as nothing new to some lawyers in the 
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yet it was only in the 2010 Padilla decision that the Court made 
explicit the fact that at least some collateral consequences, 
including the risk of deportation, fall within the purview of the 
Sixth Amendment right to counsel and are governed by the 
Strickland test for ineffective assistance.56 Specifically, the 
Padilla Court held that “[t]he weight of prevailing professional 
norms supports the view that counsel must advise her client 
regarding the risk of deportation.”57 The Padilla decision was a 
tremendous triumph for poor criminal defendants, but it was not 
an innovation; the defense community had been developing the 
doctrine of collateral consequences and articulating its 
importance for years.58 
And yet it appears that achieving redress for Jose Padilla 
was just the beginning.59 In the wake of the Supreme Court’s 
decision in 2010, members of the defense community have worked 
diligently to understand the implications of the Padilla decision 
for practitioners and to enable defenders to meet the mandate of 
Padilla.60 Not only has there been a wealth of scholarship on the 
topic,61 but most importantly, in just the last two years, the ABA 
                                                                                                     
defense bar who have long understood that they have a professional obligation 
to attend to all significant consequences of conviction, not just traditional 
criminal consequences.”). 
 56. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482 (applying the Strickland test to 
determine whether the actions of the defense attorney met her professional 
obligation of effective representation). 
 57. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Effective Assistance of 
Counsel and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 697, 712–23 
(2002) (explaining why the collateral–direct consequences distinction was 
inconsistent with the Court’s own Sixth Amendment analysis and with 
prevailing practice norms). The Court’s opinion in Padilla made reference to 
well-developed professional standards, all of which suggested that advising one’s 
client regarding deportation, among other collateral consequences, was central 
to effective representation. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482–83 (“[T]hese 
standards may be valuable measures of the prevailing professional norms of 
effective representation, especially as these standards have been adapted to deal 
with the intersection of modern criminal prosecutions and immigration law.”). 
 59. See Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1486–87 (finding sufficient reason for 
Padilla’s counsel to be deemed constitutionally deficient). 
 60. See infra notes 62–66 and accompanying text (highlighting some of the 
of the defense community’s accomplishments in meeting the Padilla standard). 
 61. See, e.g., Symposium, Padilla and the Future of the Defense Function, 39 
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has created a national, searchable database that allows defenders 
and policymakers to identify relevant collateral consequences by 
jurisdiction.62 This “National Inventory of Collateral 
Consequences” is still a work-in-progress, but to date, it reflects 
the data for nine states and the federal system.63 Users can 
search the database by categories and keywords.64 This 
interactive resource will help defenders research issues for 
clients, while enabling policymakers to identify redundant and 
unnecessary collateral consequences.65  
The importance of the development of the collateral 
consequences doctrine cannot be overstated. Not only did the 
legal academy and defense community succeed in making 
consideration of such consequences a constitutional imperative,66 
but also, growing awareness of these consequences may change 
criminal justice policy in broader ways. Knowledge of the sheer 
breadth of these collateral consequences is changing and will 
continue to change how defenders practice, how legislators decide 
when and whether to increase consequences of a conviction, and 
what society thinks of as a “minor” crime. In sum, the Court’s 
decision in Padilla was an enormous victory for the defense 
community, and scholars and defenders are only beginning to 
                                                                                                     
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1 (2011) (symposium issue dedicated to Padilla’s 
implementation).   
 62. National Inventory of the Collateral Consequences of Conviction, A.B.A., 
http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/ (follow the link to enter the site; then 
click to agree to the terms and conditions and enter the site) (last visited Apr. 2, 
2013) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See National Inventory Of The Collateral Consequences Of Conviction: 
Project Description, A.B.A. 3, http://www.abacollateralconsequences.org/ 
CollateralConsequences/docs/ProjectDescription.gp.ml.pdf (“The website will 
make it possible for criminal and civil lawyers to determine which collateral 
consequences are triggered by particular categories of offenses, for affected 
individuals to understand the limits on their rights and opportunities, and for 
lawmakers . . . to understand the full measure of . . . sanctions and 
disqualifications.”). 
 66. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (detailing the efforts of the 
defense community in developing an emphasis on the collateral consequences of 
defense counsel’s actions). 
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understand the ways in which it will change our criminal justice 
system.  
C. The Trend Toward Data-Driven Analysis and Advocacy 
Historically, in many pockets of the country, defenders 
operated below the “data radar.”67 There was no independent 
statewide agency overseeing the defense function; there was no 
way to track caseloads; and relatedly, there was no way for 
defenders to challenge excessive caseloads as a violation of their 
ethical duties.68 In some parts of the country, this is still true 
today.69 One of the more recent and most promising 
accomplishments within the defense community, however, is its 
movement toward data-driven analysis and advocacy.70  
Across the country, there is great variety when it comes to 
the question of whether and how defenders measure caseloads.71 
Some offices, like PDS in D.C., not only have statutorily-set 
caseloads, but they have a refined system for managing the 
assignment of new cases and distributing the office’s workload.72 
                                                                                                     
 67. See infra notes 68–69 (providing a look at some of the inadequacies of 
data collection in areas of the United States). 
 68. See, e.g., FINAL REPORT OF THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME COURT 
COMMITTEE ON RACIAL AND GENDER BIAS IN THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 184, 
http://www.pacourts.us/NR/rdonlyres/EC162941-F233-4FC6-9247-
54BFE3D2840D/0/FinalReport.pdf (“Many of the smaller counties could not 
even estimate their caseloads; other counties collected certain data, but could 
not break down the data into types of cases. Even Philadelphia, the largest 
county in the Commonwealth, uses a strictly manual case tracking system.”). 
 69. See MAREA BEEMAN, USING DATA TO SUSTAIN AND IMPROVE PUBLIC 
DEFENSE PROGRAMS 10 (2012), http://www.txcourts.gov/tidc/pdf/Sustainingand 
ImprovingPublicDefenseWithData082912.pdf (providing guidance on how to 
develop the definition of a case to those public defender offices that have not yet 
established a method for collecting that type of data). 
 70. See EIGHT GUIDELINES, supra note 40, at 2 (listing one of guidelines for 
public defense as considering the time and tasks dedicated to each case, which 
can be monitored through keeping accurate data). 
 71. See infra notes 72–73 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
some of the different procedures set in place for data collection). 
 72. See NORM LEFSTEIN, SECURING REASONABLE CASELOADS: ETHICS AND 
LAW IN PUBLIC DEFENSE 205–13 (2011), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
content/dam/aba/publications/books/ls_sclaid_def_securing_reasonable_caseload
s.authcheckdam.pdf (describing PDS’s governing statute and caseload 
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In other, typically smaller and more rural offices, there is no 
system in place for measuring workloads, and there is no clear 
definition of what constitutes a case.73 National defender 
organizations and statewide defender offices are trying to change 
these patchwork methods of data collection and analysis across 
the country.74  
The National Legal Aid & Defender Association (NLADA) 
has developed a committee of academics and practitioners whose 
charge is to identify best practices regarding defender data 
collection and to disseminate this information nationally.75 The 
data collection and research that has occurred within the North 
Carolina Office of Indigent Defense Services (IDS) serves as a 
model of what jurisdictions can ultimately do with good data, and 
its work has served as the starting point for the NLADA 
committee.76 Created in 2000 through legislation, IDS has 
studied several important aspects of the North Carolina system, 
including  
comparative resources available to prosecution and indigent 
defense; the time required to resolve criminal cases by type of 
attorney (public defender, private assigned counsel and 
retained); the impact on public safety and indigent defense 
costs of reclassifying minor misdemeanor offenses that rarely 
or never result in jail sentences, and an annual comparative 
review of public defender and private assigned counsel costs.77  
While the NLADA committee has only recently begun its work, 
the short-term goal is to implement similar data collection and 
                                                                                                     
management). 
 73. See BEEMAN, supra note 69, at 10 (providing an explanation of why it is 
necessary to have a clear definition of what a case is when tracking data). 
 74. See id. at 3–15 (creating guidelines for maintaining an effective and 
helpful data collection system in a public defender office). 
 75. See NATIONAL RESEARCH & DATA ANALYSIS ADVISORY COMMITTEE 
MEMBERS (2012), http://www.ncids.org/Systems%20Evaluation%20Project/Pro 
jects/RDA_Members.pdf (listing the members of the National Research & Data 
Analysis Advisory Committee). This committee is in the early stages of its 
efforts, and in full disclosure, the author is a member of the committee. 
 76. See BEEMAN, supra note 69, at 16–18 (examining North Carolina’s data 
collection program and how the state was able to use data to disprove 
inaccuracies provided by the Conference of District Attorneys). 
 77. Id. at 16. 
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analysis models in several test-pilot jurisdictions. In the long run, 
the committee seeks to enable defender offices nationwide to 
collect and leverage good data by creating a “toolkit” that walks 
the office through the process from start to finish. As chief 
defenders know, only with good data may lawyers decline new 
case assignments, garner adequate financial resources in the 
budget process, and achieve systemic reform.78  
Recent public defense lawsuits have demonstrated the 
importance of high-quality data.79 I discuss the recent lawsuit in 
Missouri and the pending suit in Florida in Part IV.B,80 but it is 
worth mentioning here that neither suit—one of which the state 
defender won and the other of which is pending before the state 
supreme court—would have gotten off the ground without good 
data.81 Courts want to know exactly how many cases defenders 
are handling; how long they are spending on each case; what is 
the relative difficulty of each case; and how chief defenders are 
allocating office-wide resources to distribute the workload evenly. 
Defenders are recognizing that, if they are to seek relief in court, 
they must have the data to demonstrate their claims that lawyers 
have far too many cases and cannot provide constitutional 
representation to their clients.82 
While the shift toward empirical assessment within defender 
offices is relatively new and poses significant fiscal and training 
challenges, especially in smaller, cash-strapped jurisdictions, it 
does represent the future of indigent defense reform.83 The 
                                                                                                     
 78. See id. at 2 (“Time-strapped, budget-minded legislators with little 
understanding of criminal defense practice look to clear indicators and data on 
which to assess indigent defense system needs.”). 
 79. See infra Part IV.B (discussing the impact that defender’s workload 
data has on the outcome of court decisions). 
 80. See infra Part IV.B (looking at a case in Missouri and another in 
Florida in which defenders used data illustrating their caseload to support their 
claim). 
 81. See BEEMAN, supra note 69, at 22 (listing some of the data that may be 
requested during litigation challenging the caseload of a public defender office). 
 82. See id. (“Data collected by public defender programs become essential 
in the event litigation is brought to challenge caseload or any other facet of a 
program.”). 
 83. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (looking at the status of 
some smaller and underfunded public defender’s offices and the work that is 
being done to improve the offices). 
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defense community must sustain this shift toward data-driven 
analysis and advocacy.  
 In discussing these three developments, I do not mean to 
imply that these are the only accomplishments within the defense 
community in the post-Gideon era. Surely, there are many others 
that I have not included here, but I have focused on these three 
because I view them as having made a lasting and far-reaching 
impact on the defense function nationwide. I also think that these 
three accomplishments will be important to the next fifty years of 
enforcing Gideon—the subject to which I now turn. 
IV. The Next Fifty Years of Enforcing the Right to Counsel 
Despite thoughtful reform suggestions from the bar and the 
academy, the entrenched crisis in indigent defense persists today, 
and there is no reason to think that dramatic improvement is on 
the near horizon. If we accept this reality, we must ask where our 
efforts are most effectively deployed in the future. In this Part of 
the Article, I offer three suggestions as to how the defense 
community might re-prioritize, and, in some cases re-think 
altogether, its reform initiatives. In particular, I suggest that: 
(1) defenders should seize upon the political and economic climate 
to pursue diversion and decriminalization;84 (2) not all litigation 
strategies are created alike, and systemic suits should be 
exclusively a measure of last resort;85 and (3) the defense 
community needs to explore the role that nonlawyers can play in 
protecting the rights of criminal defendants.86 
                                                                                                     
 84. See infra Part IV.A (looking at how the current political and economic 
climate creates an opportunity for the public defense community to pursue 
decriminalization of lesser crimes). 
 85. See infra Part IV.B (suggesting the types of claims that public 
defenders should be pursuing in court, and which types should be avoided). 
 86. See infra Part IV.C (examining the flaws of appointing too many 
lawyers to cases in which a nonlawyer could fill the same role). 
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A. Diversion and Decriminalization Should Be Pursued . . . and 
Might Even Be Achievable 
One way to relieve some of the pressure on the public defense 
function is to take cases out of the system through 
decriminalization and diversion. Scholars have expressed mixed 
sentiments about these ideas in the past; some academics think 
that such efforts will never happen or will have little impact on 
the system even if they do, while others have been more 
optimistic.87 I want to suggest, though, that timing is everything, 
and that today’s political and economic climates make these 
efforts more achievable than they have been in recent history.  
The recession and continued sluggish economy have changed 
voter sentiment regarding criminal justice issues, and politicians 
are taking note.88 California provides the clearest example.89 
There are a little over 230,000 people incarcerated in California’s 
jails and prisons.90 The explosion in the state’s prison population 
is a relatively recent phenomenon,91 and the state’s corrections 
budget has ballooned along with it.92 The state’s 2000–2001 
                                                                                                     
 87. Compare Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. 
L. REV. 223, 249–65 (2007) (demonstrating that decriminalization has happened 
and is sustainable despite conventional wisdom), with Erik Luna, The 
Overcriminalization Phenomenon, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 719–30 (2005) 
(explaining incentives for various actors to increase criminal sanctions). 
 88. See Inimai Chettiar, Criminal Justice Reform Can Help With State 
Fiscal Woes, CENTER FOR AM. PROGRESS (Jan. 11, 2012), http://www. 
americanprogress.org/issues/civil-liberties/news/2012/01/11/10970/criminal-jus 
tice-reform-can-help-with-state-fiscal-woes/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (looking at 
how the recession has encouraged legislators from both parties to make changes 
in criminal justice) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 89. See discussion infra notes 90–91 and accompanying text (illustrating 
the changes in the criminal justice structure in California). 
 90. SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/map/ map.cfm 
(roll over the map to see the statistics for California) (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) 
(counting both jail and prison inmates, The Sentencing Project finds there are 
231,163 people incarcerated in California) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 91. JOSEPH M. HAYES, PUB. POL’Y INST. OF CAL., CALIFORNIA’S CHANGING 
PRISON POPULATION (2011), http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/jtf/JTF_Prisons 
JTF.pdf (describing a 73% prison population increase between 1990 and 2005). 
 92. See infra notes 93–94 and accompanying text (illustrating the increase 
in California’s budget for corrections between the years 2000 and 2012). 
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budget allocated 5.8% of total expenditures to corrections and 
11.5% to higher education.93 In contrast, the 2012–2013 budget 
allocated roughly the same percentage of total expenditures to 
corrections and to higher education—approximately 7%.94 
The state is already in the process of complying with a 
Supreme Court order to reduce its prison population by nearly 
one-third,95 and this past November, California voters weighed in 
on two important criminal justice issues: the state’s three-strikes 
law and its use of the death penalty. The referendum to repeal 
the state’s death penalty failed, but only by a margin of six 
points.96 Fifty-three percent of voters supported the death 
penalty, and as the manager of the campaign to repeal the death 
penalty noted: “This issue is not going away . . . . [Fifty-three][] 
percent is not a mandate for carrying out executions. This state is 
clearly evenly divided on the death penalty.”97 Also in November, 
                                                                                                     
 93. CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., GOVERNOR’S BUDGET HIGHLIGHTS, 2000–2001, at 83 
(2000), http://www.dof.ca.gov/budget/historical/2000-01/documents/Highlights00 
-01.pdf (showing corrections expenditures as 5.8% of total expenditures and 
higher education as 11.5%). 
 94. CAL. DEP’T OF FIN., GOVERNOR’S BUDGET SUMMARY—2012–2013, at 19 
(2012), http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/BudgetSummary/SummaryCharts.pdf 
(showing 7.8% of expenditures going toward corrections and 7.1% going to 
higher education). 
 95. See Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1943–47 (2011) (requiring the 
California prison population reduction); see also CAL. DEP’T OF CORRECTIONS & 
REHABILITATION, CORRECTIONS: YEAR AT A GLACE 2011, at 5 (2011), 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/News/docs/2011_Annual_Report_FINAL.pdf (discussing 
the state’s prison population reduction effort). 
 96. See Howard Mintz & Matt O’Brien, Proposition 34: Death Penalty 
Repeal Fails, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 7, 2012, 3:17 PM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/elections/ci_21943752/california-proposition-34-
voters-decide-whether-keep-states (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“Proposition 34 
lost by about 6 percentage points, dimming the hopes of death penalty 
opponents who were trying to abolish the death penalty in California and clear 
the largest death row in the nation.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 97. Id. Indeed, given its costs, voters may be asked to revisit the death 
penalty issue in the years to come. In this past election year, some vocal 
proponents of the repeal were one-time capital punishment supporters who 
evolved to view its costs as unjustifiable. For example, former Los Angeles 
District Attorney, Gil Garcetti, explained: “I was a supporter and believer in the 
death penalty, but I’ve begun to see that the system doesn’t work and it isn’t 
functional . . . . It costs an obscene amount of money.” Ashby Jones & Steve 
Eder, Costs Test Backing for Death Penalty, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2012, at A3. 
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California voters elected to amend the state’s three-strikes law so 
that an offender’s third strike must be violent in order to trigger 
the twenty-five-years-to-life sentence.98 An overwhelming 
majority of the electorate voted to enact this reform, in large part 
because of the state’s enormous corrections budget.99 
While California is unique in some respects,100 it is not the 
only state where voter sentiments are evolving on criminal justice 
issues. The people of Washington and Colorado recently voted to 
legalize marijuana,101 while lawmakers in Utah and Montana are 
seeking to abolish the death penalty in large part because of its 
costs.102 In recent years Texas, Kansas, Mississippi, South 
Carolina, Kentucky, and Ohio have all passed bipartisan criminal 
justice reform legislation designed to reduce prison populations 
and costs.103 These bills have mandated nonprison punishments 
                                                                                                     
 98. See Don Thompson, Initiative Asks for Softening of Three Strikes Law, 
SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 7, 2012, 12:20 PM), http://www.mercury 
news.com/news/ci_21720146/initiative-asks-softening-3-strikes-law (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2013) (explaining that California’s Proposition 36 would “modify the 
nation’s toughest three-strikes law so only a violent or serious third felony 
would lead to a life sentence”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review).  
 99. See Tracey Kaplan, California Proposition 36: Voters Overwhelmingly 
Ease Three Strikes Law, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS (Nov. 7, 2012, 3:02 AM), 
http://www.mercurynews.com/elections/ci_21943951/prop-36-huge-lead-early-re 
turns?IADID=Search-www.mercurynews.com-www.mercurynews.com (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2013) (explaining that the California measure was passed by 
more than a 20% point margin) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 100. For example, California has the largest death row population in the 
nation, and its population is nearly twice the size of the next largest death row 
in Florida. See Death Row Inmates by State, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR. (Oct. 1, 
2012), http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-inmates-state-and-size-death-
row-year (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (showing the figures for inmates on death 
row in each state as of October 1, 2012, with California having 724 on its death 
row and Florida having 411 on its death row) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 101. See Emily Bazelon, Don’t Touch Their Stash!: Why Eric Holder Should 
Let Colorado and Washington Experiment with Drugs, SLATE (Nov. 7, 2012, 4:25 
PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2012/11/colo 
rado_and_washington_legalize_marijuana_will_the_obama_administration.html 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (discussing the interaction of these state laws with 
federal drug policy) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 102. See generally Jones & Eder, supra note 97. 
 103. See generally AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, SMART REFORM IS POSSIBLE: 
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for certain offenses and expanded the terms of parole 
eligibility.104 Thus, today more than ever in recent history, voters 
may be amenable to criminal justice reforms that divert offenders 
away from the system in order to free up tax dollars.  
At the same time, the political pressure to be “tough on 
crime” may be abating. In recent years, a number of conservative 
politicians have taken progressive positions on criminal justice 
matters, and in the process they have created the space for 
bipartisan reform. For example, while in office, Maryland’s 
Governor Ehrlich instituted an innovative approach to executive 
clemency and standardized the process.105 “From 2003–2007, the 
Republican Governor reviewed 444 applications and granted 228 
pardons[][; t]o date, 99% of those pardoned have not re-
offended . . . .”106 In fact, in the last year, two of three Governors 
who have received significant attention regarding executive 
clemency grants have been Republicans.107  
                                                                                                     
STATES REDUCING INCARCERATION RATES AND COSTS WHILE PROTECTING 
COMMUNITIES (2011), www.aclu.org/files/assets/smartreformispossible.pdf.  
 104. See id. at 11–14 (providing an overview of the reforms). 
 105. See Press Release, Maryland Governor Robert. L. Ehrlich, Jr., Governor 
Ehrlich Clarifies Executive Clemency Process (Aug. 29, 2003), http://msa. 
maryland.gov/megafile/msa/speccol/sc5300/sc5339/000113/001000/001015/unrest
ricted/20051987e.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (detailing the new clemency 
process) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 106. Proposal for the Ehrlich Center for Criminal Justice Policy 1 (on file 
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Robert L. Ehrlich Jr., 
Obama’s Unpardonable Neglect of Clemency: Robert Ehrlich, Who Knows 
Something About the Pardon Process, Questions President Obama’s Commitment 
to Fairness, BALT. SUN (Jan. 13, 2013), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-
13/news/bs-ed-ehrlich-pardons-20130113_1_clemency-petitions-unpardonable-
neglect-activism (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (providing Governor Ehrlich’s pardon 
statistics) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 107. The three Governors who have received significant coverage in the last 
year are Oregon’s Governor Kitzhaber, who is a Democrat, and Haley Barbour of 
Mississippi and Ohio’s John Kasich, both of whom are Republicans. See Cara H. 
Drinan, Clemency in a Time of Crisis, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1123, 1147–50 (2012) 
(discussing the governors’ clemency actions). Recently, however, Governor 
Barbour has received criticism surrounding a deadly shooting allegedly 
committed by a man Barbour pardoned during his last week in office. See Kari 
Huus, Man Pardoned by Gov. Haley Barbour Linked to Deadly Barbeque 
Shootout, ABCNEWS.COM (Jan. 12, 2013, 1:21 AM), http://usnews.nbcnews. 
com/_news/2013/01/12/16471961-man-pardoned-by-gov-haley-barbour-linked-to-
deadly-barbeque-shootout (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (discussing the shooting) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).   
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These individual actions are consistent with the proposals of 
the Right on Crime organization. Led by prominent Republicans, 
including Newt Gingrich, Jeb Bush, and Ed Meese,108 the 
organization seeks to promote criminal justice reform that is 
consistent with small government, personal responsibility, and a 
results-oriented approach to public policy.109 Finally, voters today 
seem entirely uninterested in criminal justice policy,110 and that 
reality may provide some room for maneuvering in contrast to 
times when politicians have felt scrutinized in this arena.111 
Criminal justice reform may be emerging as a truly bipartisan 
issue.112  
In sum, there are a number of variables that make today’s 
climate ripe for criminal justice reform. Defenders should seize 
upon this moment and pursue reform measures that would 
permanently take some pressure off of the defense function going 
forward. 
B. Surgical Litigation Is Better than Systemic Litigation 
Defenders also need to recognize that the era of structural 
public defense litigation—that is, suits that argue entire public 
                                                                                                     
 108. See id. at 1–2 (listing the Statement of Principles’s signatories). 
 109. See generally Statement of Principles, RIGHT ON CRIME (Oct. 22, 2012), 
http://www.rightoncrime.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/RightOnCrime-State 
ment-of-Principles.pdf. 
 110. For example, crime and sentencing policy does not even make the top 
list of voter priorities. See Jeffrey M. Jones, Americans Want Next President to 
Prioritize Jobs, Corruption, GALLUP POL. (July 30, 2012), http://www. 
gallup.com/poll/156347/americans-next-president-prioritize-jobs-corruption.aspx 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (discussing voter priorities for the 2012 presidential 
election) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 111. See Doug Berman, Obama Hasn’t Reformed Criminal Justice—Could 
Romney Do Better?, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 13, 2012, 12:00 AM), http://www. 
thedailybeast.com/articles/2012/04/13/obama-hasn-t-reformed-criminal-justice-
could-romney-do-better.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (discussing the historical 
reality that Democrats especially felt constrained in this arena) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 112. See, e.g., Catholic University Law Review, Bipartisan Criminal Justice 
Reform, http://lawreview.law.edu/symposium.cfm (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) 
(explaining its 2013 symposium) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
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defense systems regularly violate the constitutional rights of 
their clients—is waning.113 Future litigation efforts to improve 
public defense systems need to be much more surgical in nature. 
In prior works I have discussed and promoted the efforts of 
litigants who bring systemic suits challenging entire public 
defense functions,114 and there have been some recent successes 
in systemic public defense litigation115—so one may query why I 
am suggesting a shift away from these suits. The answer lies in 
resource constraints and the obligation to choose wisely how 
resources are deployed in the years to come.  
Why are system-wide challenges perhaps not the best use of 
resources? To begin, these suits are incredibly time-consuming 
and expensive. In New York, lawyers recently spent three years 
litigating the justiciability of a class-action challenge to New 
York’s county-based defense system.116 In addition, even those 
few systemic suits that have been “successful”—and by that I 
mean suits that have been resolved either through a consent 
decree or a favorable court opinion—require perpetual 
enforcement.117 Pennsylvania provides a good case in point. 
                                                                                                     
 113. A discussion of suits of this type is outside the scope of this brief Article. 
For an overview of this type of litigation, see generally Drinan, Third 
Generation, supra note 15, at 4 28–78 (providing an in-depth look at the 
historical transition of structural public defense litigation); Adele Bernhard, 
Take Courage: What the Courts Can Do to Improve the Quality of Criminal 
Justice Services, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 293, 310–46 (2002) (discussing the various 
legal challenges used in this type of litigation); Note, Effectively Ineffective: The 
Failure of Courts to Address Underfunded Indigent Defense Systems, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 1731, 1736–53 (2005) (discussing the effects of three significant suits in 
structural public defense litigation). 
 114. See Drinan, Third Generation, supra note 15, at 478 (“[R]ecent 
[systemic] suits designed to improve indigent defense systems have enjoyed 
greater success than their predecessors, and there is good reason to think that 
future litigants bringing the third generation of these suits can capitalize—and 
even improve—upon these recent suits.”). 
 115. See id. at 458–62 (discussing those suits that have been successful and 
what attributes they share); see also Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 
220–21 (N.Y. 2010) (finding cognizable a class-action claim that a county-based 
public defense system was unconstitutional). 
 116. See Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 220–21 (rendering the court’s 
decision on justiciability three years after the complaint was filed). 
 117. See Reddy, supra note 28, at 33 (“The ultimate success of such suits 
thus depends almost exclusively on the breadth of the resulting judicially 
ordered relief, as policy-makers will likely do little more than is necessary to 
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Despite the ACLU’s victory in a 1996 lawsuit challenging 
Allegheny County’s Public Defender Office, lawyers spent years 
attempting to enforce the consent decree in that case.118 And 
today, things are about as bad as they were when the suit was 
filed.119 Likewise, in New York, the ACLU secured a very 
favorable decision from the state’s highest court in its challenge 
of the county-based public defense system.120 Yet, it is unclear 
whether that suit will generate lasting reform.121 Judicial 
victories still require legislative funding to breathe life into the 
court’s holding—funding that must be fought for annually and 
funding that, history tells us, will be inadequate. There is 
simply little money to be had in many jurisdictions, and 
legislators may rationally choose to spend it on issues other 
than indigent defense122—whether that choice is constitutional 
or not. 
There may still be a place for these systemic suits, but they 
need to be seen for what they are: a course of last resort. For 
example, in jurisdictions where counsel can demonstrate 
                                                                                                     
meet their obligations under the terms of the court-ordered remedy.”). 
 118. See id. at 28–30 (discussing the difficulties in implementing the consent 
decree, which continued until 2005 when the court’s jurisdiction over the case 
finally ceased). 
 119. See David Carroll, Gideon Alert: State-Sanctioned Commission Finds 
Pennsylvania Defaulting on the Sixth Amendment, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER 
ASS’N (Dec. 12, 2011, 2:46 PM), http://www.nlada.net/jseri/blog/gideon-alert-
state-sanctioned-commission-finds-pennsylvania-defaulting-sixth-amendment 
(last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (discussing the constitutional deficiencies of the 
Pennsylvania public defender system) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 120. See Hurrell-Harring, 930 N.E.2d at 225–27 (ruling in favor of the 
petitioners).  
 121. See David Carroll, Gideon Alert: Budget Deal Threatens to Gut New 
York Indigent Defense Efforts Before They Begin, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER 
ASS’N (Mar. 30, 2011, 12:31 PM), http://www.nlada.net/jseri/blog/gideon-alert-
budget-deal-threatens-gut-new-york-indigent-defense-efforts-they-begin (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2013) (describing mixed results to date) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 122. See Brown, supra note 14, at 809 (“Even legislators who concede 
indigent defense is worthy and important must still rank its priority for 
marginal budget dollars relative to funds for medical care for the poor, foster 
care services, improvement of substandard schools, or toxic clean-up of grave 
environmental health risks.”).  
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constructive denial of counsel altogether,123 such a suit may be 
not only worthwhile but also necessary. Moreover, in jurisdictions 
where right to counsel violations are egregious and longstanding, 
the Department of Justice’s recently developed Access to Justice 
Initiative (ATJ) may be willing to lend support and leverage.124 If, 
for example, lawyers could demonstrate constructive denial of 
counsel with good data and ATJ is willing to file an amicus brief 
in the suit,125 the resource expenditure may be justified. In many 
instances, though, these suits will drain the resources of the 
defense function and require ongoing enforcement efforts—efforts 
that may be fruitless.  
The kind of litigation that is worthwhile—the kind that 
deserves priority in the next few decades—is the kind that shores 
up the inherent authority of the defense function in the first 
place. Missouri, a state with an indigent defense function that 
has been struggling for years because of insufficient funding and 
excessive caseloads,126 provides a good case in point. In 2007, the 
Missouri Public Defender Commission adopted a protocol for 
determining the maximum number of cases that each of its offices 
could effectively handle.127 In 2010, the state Public Defender 
tried unsuccessfully to enforce this protocol, but a trial court 
judge continued to appoint the Public Defender to new cases.128 In 
                                                                                                     
 123. See, e.g., Hurrell-Harring v. State, 930 N.E.2d 217, 225 (N.Y. 2010) 
(finding that the complaint stated a claim for constructive denial of counsel). 
 124. For a general description of this office, see The Access to Justice 
Initiative, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., http://www.justice.gov/atj/index.html (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2013) (describing ATJ’s mission) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review).  
 125. See, e.g., ATJ’s Two-Year Anniversary Major Accomplishments, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUST. 1, 1–3 (June 2012), http://www.justice.gov/atj/ accomplishments-
7-9-12.pdf (describing the ways in which the ATJ provides assistance and 
resources for indigent defense). 
 126. See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Pratte, 298 S.W.3d 870, 
875–77 (Mo. 2009) (en banc) (discussing the history of public defenders and the 
system’s challenges). 
 127. See id. at 878 (“The rule authorizes the commission to ‘maintain a 
caseload standards protocol identifying the maximum caseload each district 
office can be assigned without compromising effective representation.’” (citation 
omitted)). 
 128. See State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 592, 
597 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (“[T]he trial court said it believed it ‘had no choice’ but 
to appoint a public defender, regardless of the public defender’s ability to 
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doing so, the trial court effectively gutted the defender office’s 
workload protocol altogether.129  
On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court considered whether 
the Public Defender, under its current regulations, could refuse 
new cases when its workload prevents effective representation of 
additional clients.130 In a 4–3 decision, the state supreme court 
held that the Public Defender acted pursuant to valid regulatory 
authority in devising its workload protocol, and thus its refusal of 
additional cases was lawful.131 Moreover, the court held that the 
Sixth Amendment—and prevailing ethical standards—requires 
that indigent defendants have effective, and “not just pro forma, 
representation.”132 Thus, the Missouri Supreme Court upheld the 
legitimacy of the commission’s rulemaking authority and its 
ability to determine when defender offices were at full workload 
capacity.133  
A similar suit is pending before the Florida Supreme 
Court.134 There, the Miami-Dade County defender has been 
fighting for years to protect the right of defenders to refuse new 
cases, withdraw from representation when they are operating 
under excessive workloads, or both.135 In the case before the 
                                                                                                     
provide competent and effective representation in another case, . . . as the court 
could identify no other realistic mechanism by which to provide other counsel.”). 
 129. See id. at 600–01 (describing the trial court’s appointment of the public 
defender’s office despite the defender’s objection that the appointment violated 
the workload protocol). 
 130. See id. at 605 (describing the issue). 
 131. See id. at 612 (“[B]ecause the trial court did not find the regulation 
invalid or inapplicable, it erred in ordering the public defender to disobey it.”). 
 132. Id. at 607.  
 133. See id. at 612 (stating that the commission’s protocol “was 
promulgated . . . pursuant to authority vested in it by the legislature, and there 
has been no showing that the rule is invalid or was applied improperly”). 
 134. See Editorial, Florida Defense Attorneys Overloaded, TAMPA BAY TIMES 
(June 6, 2012, 5:22 PM), http://www.tampabay.com/opinion/editorials/article 
1233955.ece (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (explaining that the Florida Supreme 
Court will decide “whether a public defender’s office may obtain relief from 
caseloads so excessive that attorneys are unable to meet basic professional 
standards of representation”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 135. See id. (describing the ongoing legal battle, which started four years 
ago).  
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Florida Supreme Court, the defender at the heart of the suit 
handled more than 400 felony cases per year—a caseload well in 
excess of nationally recognized standards.136  
These claims are precisely the types of claims that defender 
offices should pursue in the future. When defender offices win 
these suits, the victory is complete. No perpetual battle for 
funding awaits them. Rather, if the legislature starves the 
defense function of resources, the defender office will have the 
inherent authority to refuse cases and to represent clients only 
when it can do so in a constitutional manner.137  
C. The Defense Community Needs to Embrace Nonlawyers as 
Guardians of the Right to Counsel 
Finally, the defense community needs to be more expansive 
in its view of what nonlawyers can do to protect the rights of poor 
criminal defendants. For the last few decades, criminal defense 
advocates have consistently sought and, in many ways, have 
achieved an expansion of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in criminal cases.138 At the same time, lawyers for the poor have 
sought the creation of a civil Gideon doctrine that would provide 
state-funded lawyers in many civil contexts.139 Yet, as I discussed 
in Part II, even the Court’s well-articulated Gideon principles 
have never been fully implemented for criminal defendants.140 
                                                                                                     
 136. See id. (“National standards put maximum annual caseloads at 150. 
Assistant public defenders in Miami-Dade were responsible for 400 or more 
felony cases.”); see also Initial Brief on the Merits, Pub. Defender, Eleventh Jud. 
Cir. of Fla. v. State, No. 10-1349, 2011 WL 7099915, at *11 (Fla. Dec. 21, 2011) 
(noting that the trial judge’s order determined that “the caseload of the felony 
public defenders in the Eleventh Judicial Circuit . . . far exceeds any recognized 
standard for the maximum number of felony cases a criminal defense attorney 
should handle annually”). 
 137. See, e.g., State ex rel. Mo. Pub. Defender Comm’n v. Waters, 370 S.W.3d 
592, 611–12 (Mo. 2012) (en banc) (upholding the state public defender office’s 
refusal of the court’s appointment of additional cases). 
 138. See Benjamin H. Barton & Stephanos Bibas, Triaging Appointed-
Counsel Funding and Pro Se Access to Justice, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 967, 968–69 
(2012) (noting Sixth Amendment expansions over the past century). 
 139. See id. at 977–80 (discussing the civil Gideon movement). 
 140. See supra notes 22–32 and accompanying text (discussing the status of 
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Further, just recently, the Supreme Court quashed the hopes of 
the civil Gideon movement, holding that the Due Process Clause 
does not require a lawyer to help a civil litigant—even one facing 
jail time.141  
The defense community needs to retreat from the position 
that “[i]f appointing some lawyers is good, then appointing more 
lawyers must be better.”142 Budget constraints and excessive 
caseloads have made triage an essential component of modern 
public defense.143 Defenders may have different methods for 
sorting and prioritizing clients, but as a practical matter, when 
an attorney is representing more than 400 felony cases144 or more 
than 1,000 misdemeanor cases per year,145 there is no avoiding 
the practice. As one public defender in rural Minnesota 
explained, “[E]ffective public defense requires a triage approach: 
quickly identifying which cases have legal or factual issues, and 
which cases are more likely to go to trial, then focusing time and 
resources on those cases.”146 Another defender says: “‘We’re going 
to prioritize legal representation for the people who are already in 
custody. They’ve lost their freedom. Justice for people who are not 
in custody will have to be delayed.’”147  
                                                                                                     
the right to counsel doctrine at present). 
 141. See Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519–20 (2011) (discussing 
procedural safeguards that can stand in for a lawyer). 
 142. Barton & Bibas, supra note 138, at 968.  
 143. The word “triage” is commonly used in medicine, and “refers to the 
systematic sorting, assigning of priority order, and allocation of resources to 
those in need.” Meehan Rasch, A New Public-Interest Appellate Model: Public 
Counsel’s Court-Based Self-Help Clinic and Pro Bono “Triage” for Indigent Pro 
Se Civil Litigants on Appeal, 11 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 461, 465 n.13 (2010) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 144. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text (discussing the Miami-
Dade caseload litigation). 
 145. See ROBERT C. BORUCHOWITZ ET AL., NAT’L ASSOC. OF CRIM. DEF. LAW., 
MINOR CRIMES, MASSIVE WASTE: THE TERRIBLE TOLL OF AMERICA’S BROKEN 
MISDEMEANOR COURTS 21 (2009), http://www.nacdl.org/reports/misdemeanor/ 
(click on PDF link to view report) (stating jurisdictions in which public 
defenders handle more than 1,000 misdemeanor cases per year). 
 146. J.D. Schmid, A Day in the Life of a Public Defender, INTHEFRAY MAG. 
(Feb. 3, 2009), http://inthefray.org/joomla/index2.php?option=com_content& 
do_pdf=1&id=3188 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review).  
 147. Bob Collins, A Day in the Life of a Minnesota Public Defender, 
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At the same time, there is some evidence that certain 
defendants fare better—or at least as well—on their own than 
with public defense counsel. Professor Hashimoto finds that, in 
federal court, pro se misdemeanor defendants fare better in most 
cases than those who have counsel.148 Other scholars have shown 
that lay advocates can be an effective alternative to legal 
counsel.149 Rather than persisting in the pursuit of more lawyers 
for more defendants, the defense community should explore 
opportunities for nonlawyers within the indigent defense 
function. This is a matter of practical reality. 
The recent movement to secure the right to counsel at bail 
hearings in Maryland provides a good case in point. Maryland’s 
bail process has long been viewed as unconstitutional and 
unfair.150 Historically, arrested individuals appeared before a 
commissioner, whose job it was to determine if there was 
probable cause for the arrest and to set bail, if necessary.151 
Public defenders did not participate in the initial commissioner 
appearance.152 In cases in which bail was set, defendants were 
entitled to a bail review hearing before a judge usually on the 
next business day, but even then, public defenders represented 
                                                                                                     
MPRNEWS (July 1, 2008, 12:45 PM), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/collections/ 
special/columns/news_cut/archive/2008/07/a_day_in_the_life_of_a_minneso.shtm
l (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (quoting John Stewart, head of the state public 
defender’s office) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 148. See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 461, 489 (2007) (“[P]ro se misdemeanor defendants in 
federal court appear both to have lower conviction rates and to receive more 
favorable sentencing outcomes than represented misdemeanor defendants.”). 
 149. See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Up from Gideon, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 113, 
127–28 (2012) (discussing Herbert Kritzer’s work in Legal Advocacy: Lawyers 
and Nonlawyers at Work). 
 150. See Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The 
Empirical and Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1719, 1728–29 (2002) (describing the inequalities and injustices in Maryland’s 
bail process as it was over a decade ago). 
 151. See What Happens When You Are Arrested for a Crime?, MDCOURTS.GOV 
(Dec. 2003), http://www.courts.state.md.us/district/forms/criminal/dccr002br. 
html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (listing the duties of the commissioner, including 
to inform the defendant of the charges against them and to “determine[] 
whether bail should be set”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Review). 
 152. See id. (“Public defenders do not appear before the commissioner.”). 
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defendants in only a small sub-set of the state’s jurisdictions.153 
In 2006, a class of plaintiffs who had been denied counsel at bail 
hearings challenged the protocol as a violation of Maryland state 
law and the federal Constitution.154  
The state’s Public Defender, also a named defendant in the 
suit, agreed with the plaintiffs’ legal claims, but asserted from 
the get-go that his office would not be able to provide the scope of 
representation that the defendants were seeking given budget 
constraints.155 In January, 2012, the Maryland high court held 
that the plaintiffs “enjoy a right under [state law] to be 
represented at any bail hearing conducted before a 
Commissioner.”156 Immediately after the Maryland Court of 
Appeals’s decision, the Public Defender sought a stay in the 
court’s decision, citing again his office’s inability to handle the 
180,000 bail hearings that happen each year.157  
There is no disputing that a lawyer makes a difference in the 
outcome of a bail hearing.158 The legal victory in Maryland, 
                                                                                                     
 153. See id. (explaining that when public defenders did attend the bail 
review hearings, they only attended “in several of the state’s jurisdictions, 
including Baltimore, . . . blaming a lack of resources”). 
 154. See DeWolfe v. Richmond, No. 34, Sept. Term 2011, 2012 WL 10853, at 
*3–7 (Md. Jan. 4, 2012) (discussing the lawsuit filed). 
 155. See id. at *4  
The Public Defender argued that the Plaintiffs’ claims based on the 
Due Process Clause and the Public Defender Act “are well taken.” He 
argued nevertheless that the court should defer ruling on the merits 
of the claims, to give him the time to resolve budgetary constraints 
that made it impracticable for the Public Defender’s Office to provide 
counsel at the appearance before the Commissioner, while providing 
“responsible representation . . . when it really matters,” at trial and 
other critical stages of criminal proceedings. 
 156. Id. at *7.  
 157. See Tricia Bishop, Appeals Court Ruling Requires Lawyers at Bail 
Hearings, BALT. SUN (JAN 4, 2012), http://articles. baltimoresun.com/2012-01-
04/news/bs-md-public-defenders-20120104_1_public-defender-appeals-court-hea 
rings (last visited Apr. 9, 2013) (stating that the court’s ruling “was deemed 
impossible to implement by Maryland’s public defender, whose office would be 
charged with attending potentially 180,000 bail hearings that occur 24 hours a 
day each year”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 158. Douglas Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon: The Illusory Right to 
Counsel at Bail Proceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 13–21 (1998) (describing the 
critical role of counsel at bail hearings).  
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however, is “a gift of justice for poor people”159 only if it can be 
implemented without compromising the other, perhaps more 
serious matters, handled by public defenders. To date there has 
been some legislative response to the court’s decision: lawmakers 
have increased the Public Defender budget by 7.4% and have 
directed police officers to issue citations rather than make arrests 
in certain instances.160 Both measures will help to ease the strain 
that the Maryland Court of Appeals’s decision has placed on the 
already-overworked state public defenders. However, the Public 
Defender initially estimated that his office would need to hire 284 
new public defenders to comply with the court’s ruling,161 and to 
date the office has only been able to hire thirty-four new 
lawyers.162 Thus, the question remains whether the gains of this 
judicial victory will outweigh the costs it imposes on a strained 
public defender and its clients.  
The Maryland example demonstrates that suing to expand 
the right to counsel when the existing contours of that right have 
yet to be fulfilled can be risky. It also suggests that defense 
advocates need to think hard about the role of nonlawyers rather 
than more lawyers. As discussed below, the medical and private 
legal professions both provide examples of differentiating among 
skills sets, and public defense functions should consider these 
models. In the medical context, when patients go “to the doctor” 
for, say, a common cold, they may not even see a physician; in 
many cases, nurse practitioners serve as primary health care 
                                                                                                     
 159. Bishop, supra note 151.  
 160. See David Carroll, Maryland OPD Receives 7.4% Budget Increase to 
Staff Bail Hearings, SIXTH AMENDMENT CENTER (July 6, 2012), 
http://sixthamendment.org/?p=389 (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (discussing the 
legislative responses) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 161. See Tricia Bishop, Maryland Public Defender Asks for Stay in High 
Court’s Ruling, BALT. SUN (Feb. 2, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-
02-02/news/bs-md-opd-stay-20120202_1_public-defender-ruling-hearings (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2013) (“The state would have to hire 284 new public defenders to 
comply with a recent Court of Appeals ruling requiring lawyers for indigent 
defendants at thousands of annual bail hearings, according to an affidavit 
filed . . . by Maryland Public Defender Paul DeWolfe.”) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 162. See Carroll, supra note 160 (“The result was a 7.4% increase in the 
OPD budget . . . . This has allowed the Office of the Public Defender to hire 34 
new lawyers and 34 support staff.”). 
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providers.163 Most medical practices also employ physician 
assistants who, like nurse practitioners, can assess symptoms, 
make a diagnosis, and prescribe medicine.164 Finally, medical 
practices also employ medical assistants and unlicensed assistive 
personnel who are capable of asking basic intake questions and 
performing routine, simple tasks such as taking a patient’s 
height, weight, blood pressure, and temperature.165 
Each of these various medical professionals has a different 
set of educational and professional credentials, and they are paid 
according to their skill and education level.166 They work as a 
team, complementing each other, and the model frees up the time 
and resources of the physicians in an office for those services that 
only a physician can provide.167 These different professional roles 
are relatively recent creations, and they are a direct response to 
                                                                                                     
 163.  See Forum: A Bigger Role for Nurse Practitioners, PITT. POST-GAZETTE 
(Feb. 4, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/opinion/ 
perspectives/forum-a-bigger-role-for-nurse-practitioners-470677/ (last visited 
Apr. 2, 2013) (discussing the fact that the federal and state governments 
recognize nurse practitioners as highly qualified primary healthcare providers) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 164. See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Physician Assistant Profession, 
MEDLINEPLUS (Aug. 12, 2011), http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/ency/ 
article/001935.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (describing the history and role of 
physician assistants) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 165. See Is Medical Assisting For You?, AM. ASS’N OF MED. EXPERTS, 
http://www.aama-ntl.org/medassisting/right4you.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) 
(describing the range of tasks performed by medical assistants) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 166. See Differences Between a Physician Assistant and a Nurse Practitioner, 
DEGREEDIRECTORY.ORG, http://degreedirectory.org/articles/Physician_Assistant_ 
vs_Nurse_Practitioner_What_is_the_Difference_in_Education_Requirements_a
nd_Pay.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (discussing the differences in educational 
requirements and pay between a physician assistant and a nurse practitioner) 
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); FAQs on Medical Assisting 
and the CMA (AAMA), AM. ASS’N OF MED. EXPERTS, http://www.aama-
ntl.org/medassisting/faqs.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (discussing the 
educational requirements and pay for medical assistants) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 167. See, e.g., Audrey Dutton, Physician Assistants, Nurse Practitioners Fill 
Gap on Primary Care, IDAHO STATESMAN (Sept. 24, 2012), http://www.idaho 
statesman.com/2012/09/24/2286206/physician-assistants-nurse-
practitioners.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2013) (discussing how physician 
assistants and nurse practitioners are helping to alleviate Idaho’s doctor 
shortage) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
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the rising cost of health care, a shortage of doctors, and the need 
to be more responsive to a dynamic pool of patients.168  
Private law practice provides another good example of 
professional agility. Large and small law firms recognized that it 
was not a good use of an attorney’s time to make copies of 
exhibits and bind them, and clients would simply not pay for an 
attorney to do that. As a result, law practices have employed a 
range of employees with varying skill levels: attorneys, 
paralegals, secretaries, law clerks, reproduction staff personnel, 
and record keepers.169 Even more recently, though, as “big law” 
attempts to reduce costs and meet increasing client demands for 
efficiency, a new position has emerged: the “discovery 
attorney.”170 Firms now explicitly recruit attorneys for the 
discrete task of reviewing and producing documents relevant to a 
lawsuit.171 These attorneys generally earn about half as much as 
traditional incoming associates.172 Further, there may be a time 
when computers can perform the bulk of the work that 
attorneys—even discovery attorneys—now provide. Several e-
discovery software programs now review documents, searching 
for key words and alerting attorneys to the tiny percentage of 
relevant documents amidst the mass of material turned over by 
clients and opposing counsel.173 As one lawyer explained, the 
                                                                                                     
 168. See Christine Larson, Yes, the P.A. Will See You Now, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 
10, 2008, at BU10 (discussing the demand for the professionals). 
 169. See ELLEN FREEDMAN, HOW MANY NON-LAWYERS DOES IT TAKE TO RUN A 
LAW FIRM? 2–6 (2005), http://www.pa-lawfirmconsulting.com/pdfs/hr/ 
HOW_MANY_NON_LAWYERS_DOES_IT_TAKE_TO_RUN_A_LAW_FIRM.pdf 
(describing the different positions within a law firm).  
 170. See Elie Mystal, Law Graduates: Welcome to Your Barely Legal Future, 
ABOVE THE LAW (Jan. 28, 2011, 10:30 AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/01/law-
graduates-welcome-to-your-barely-legal-future/#more-55271 (last visited Apr. 2, 
2013) (“Wow, $55K-a-year, full-time positions doing document review. Does this 
work, which could be described as ‘barely legal,’ really require three years of 
expensive post-graduate education?”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law 
Review). 
 171. See id. (stating that the “discovery attorney” will be hired to handle 
document review primarily). 
 172. See id. (stating that the “discovery attorney” will make roughly 
$55,000—a small figure compared to $150,000 that a normal, full-time attorney 
will make). 
 173. See John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper 
Software, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2011, at A1 (“Now, thanks to advances in artificial 
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software holds obvious appeal for law firms: “People get bored, 
people get headaches. Computers don’t.”174 Computers also cost a 
lot less than attorneys, and they can be housed in a much more 
remote, far less expensive location than that of most urban law 
practices.175  
One may wonder what this kind of differentiation would look 
like in the context of a public defense system, and the answer is 
neither simple nor obvious. To begin, leveraging the skills of 
nonlawyers in some offices may be as basic as increasing the 
budget for support staff. A social worker, for example, costs less 
than an attorney, and she can support many attorneys at once.176 
In doing so, she brings to bear a more appropriate skill set, and, 
at the same time, frees up the attorneys to do things that only 
attorneys can do.177 On the other end of the spectrum, Professor 
Donald Dripps has suggested that lay advocates may have a role 
to play in the criminal justice system.178 In particular, he posits 
that lay advocates may make sense for some juvenile and 
misdemeanor defendants:  
As it stands a young man facing criminal charges can 
represent himself or be heard through a public defender 
swamped by files and very often with very little experience. 
The accused has no third option to be heard through a parent, 
a sibling, a religious leader, a probation officer, a coach, or a 
commanding officer. The law would trust many of these people 
                                                                                                     
intelligence, ‘e-discovery’ software can analyze documents in a fraction of the 
time for a fraction of the cost.”). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. (explaining that document review by attorneys can cost millions, 
but a recent document review by computer software cost less than $100,000). 
 176. See Paula Galowitz, Collaboration Between Lawyers and Social 
Workers: Re-Examining the Nature and Potential of the Relationship, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2123, 2126 (1999) (“Social workers can be useful in 
interviewing, evaluation, crisis intervention, short-term casework, negotiation, 
and referral.” (footnote omitted)).  
 177. See id. at 2128 (“Collaborative arrangements can help reduce the stress 
that lawyers often experience. Not only can social workers assist lawyers to 
represent clients more effectively (and thereby alleviate some of the burden), 
but they can also help lawyers deal with their feelings about their clients and 
their practice.”). 
 178. See Dripps, supra note 149, at 127–28 (recommending lay advocacy in 
juvenile and misdemeanor cases). 
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with a medical power of attorney, but not with interviewing 
witnesses or negotiating a plea.179  
In light of the challenge regarding access to counsel for bail 
hearings, it is also worth considering whether a trained lay 
person could be an effective advocate at bail proceedings, 
particularly for low-level offenders whose cases are not 
complex.180 The middle of the spectrum includes leveraging the 
skills of lawyers in training and paralegals more than we 
currently do.181 For example, the Washington State Supreme 
Court recently adopted a rule that allows nonlawyers with 
specified levels of training to provide assistance with some civil 
legal matters.182 In its order, the court recognized the significant 
unmet legal needs in the civil system and suggested that this new 
rule would enhance access to justice.183 
It is simply not realistic to seek continued expansion of the 
right to counsel in the face of five decades of legislative refusal to 
adequately fund defense functions. Accordingly, the defense 
community needs to engage in a searching exploration of the role 
that nonlawyers can play in representing poor criminal 
                                                                                                     
 179. Id. at 127 (footnotes omitted). 
 180. Cf. Turner v. Rogers, 131 S. Ct. 2507, 2519–20 (2011) (discussing 
procedural safeguards that can stand in for a lawyer). 
 181. Paralegals are not lawyers and cannot do everything that lawyers can 
do. See Frances P. Kao, No, A Paralegal Is Not A Lawyer: A Few Things to Keep 
in Mind, BUS. L. TODAY, Jan./Feb. 2007, at 11, 12–13 (discussing certain things 
a paralegal cannot do); Wendi A. Rogers, How Paralegals Can Enhance the 
Competitive Edge of the Small Firm, 72 TEX. B.J. 404, 405 (2009) (discussing the 
multi-faceted role of the paralegal); Jacqueline Meile Rasmussen & Paul M. 
Sedlacek, Paralegals: Changing the Practice of Law, 44 S.D. L. REV. 319, 331–32 
(1999) (suggesting range of tasks that paralegals can perform in the criminal 
defense function). 
 182. See WA. R. ADMIS. APR 28 Limited Practice Rule for Limited License 
Legal Technicians, available at http://www.courts.wa.gov/court_rules/?fa= 
court_rules.rulesPDF&ruleId=gaapr28&pdf=1 (“This rule is intended to permit 
trained Limited License Legal Technicians to provide limited legal assistance 
under carefully regulated circumstances in ways that expand the affordability of 
quality legal assistance which protects the public interest.”). 
 183. See Order In the Matter of the Adoption of New APR 28—Limited 
Practice Rule for Limited License Legal Technicians, 2012 WA REG TEXT 
298141 (NS) (2012), at *4–6, http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/ 
Press%20Releases/25700-A-1005.pdf (discussing the need for Limited License 
Legal Technicians). 
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defendants. Of course, the details will be complex, but the biggest 
hurdle is the immediate one: convincing the defense bar that this 
is a necessary and viable step toward sustainable indigent 
defense reform.  
V. Conclusion 
In this Article, I have attempted to provide an assessment of 
defense reform efforts over the last five decades. While the 
indigent defense crisis persists, it does so despite laudable efforts 
within the defense community. In particular, I have emphasized 
the lasting impact of the development of professional standards, 
the articulation of the collateral consequences doctrine, and the 
use of empirical data to improve the defense function. In 
conclusion, it is important to note that these significant marks of 
progress since the Gideon decision have come from within the 
defense community. Courts ultimately ratified these 
achievements, but they emanated from the defense community 
and evolved within that circle. The same should be true in the 
next five decades. Advocates of defense reform should seek to 
reform our criminal justice system in a number of ongoing ways—
some will be judicial, some will be political, and others may 
require a re-conception of criminal defense advocacy altogether.  
